Clean up and lay groundwork for challange 32
This commit is contained in:
61
src/set4.rs
61
src/set4.rs
@@ -1,6 +1,4 @@
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use std::path::Path;
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use std::fs;
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use std::{thread, time};
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use crate::{bytes::Bytes, cbc, ctr, ecb, md4, parser, sha1, utils};
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pub fn challenge25() {
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@@ -301,12 +299,29 @@ pub fn challenge30() {
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println!("[okay] Challenge 30: implemented and extended MD4 successfully");
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}
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pub fn challenge31() {
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fn insecure_compare(a: &[u8], b: &[u8]) -> bool {
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mod challenge31 {
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use std::fs;
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use crate::{bytes::Bytes, sha1};
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use std::path::Path;
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use std::{thread, time};
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pub fn verify(file: &Path, signature: &[u8], delay: u64) -> bool {
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// Have the server generate an HMAC key, and then verify that the "signature" on incoming
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// requests is valid for "file", using the "==" operator to compare the valid MAC for a
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// file with the "signature" parameter (in other words, verify the HMAC the way any normal
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// programmer would verify it).
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let key = Bytes::from_utf8("sosecretbb");
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let contents = fs::read_to_string(file);
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assert!(contents.is_ok(), "Could not read: {}", file.display());
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let contents = Bytes(contents.unwrap().as_bytes().to_vec());
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insecure_compare(&sha1::hmac_sha1(&key, &contents).0, signature, delay)
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}
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fn insecure_compare(a: &[u8], b: &[u8], delay: u64) -> bool {
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// Write a function, call it "insecure_compare", that implements the == operation by doing
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// byte-at-a-time comparisons with early exit (ie, return false at the first non-matching
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// byte).
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let delay = time::Duration::from_millis(8);
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let delay = time::Duration::from_millis(delay);
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if a.len() != b.len() {
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return false;
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}
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@@ -320,19 +335,7 @@ pub fn challenge31() {
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true
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}
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fn verify(file: &Path, signature: &[u8]) -> bool {
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// Have the server generate an HMAC key, and then verify that the "signature" on incoming
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// requests is valid for "file", using the "==" operator to compare the valid MAC for a
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// file with the "signature" parameter (in other words, verify the HMAC the way any normal
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// programmer would verify it).
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let key = Bytes::from_utf8("sosecretbb");
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let contents = fs::read_to_string(file);
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assert!(contents.is_ok(), "Could not read: {}", file.display());
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let contents = Bytes(contents.unwrap().as_bytes().to_vec());
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insecure_compare(&sha1::hmac_sha1(&key, &contents).0, signature)
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}
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fn attack(file: &Path) -> Bytes {
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pub fn attack(file: &Path, delay: u64) -> Bytes {
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const BLOCK_SIZE: usize = 20;
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let mut sig = vec![0x0; BLOCK_SIZE];
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for i in 0..BLOCK_SIZE {
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@@ -340,7 +343,7 @@ pub fn challenge31() {
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for c in 0_u8..=255_u8 {
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let now = time::Instant::now();
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sig[i] = c;
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verify(file, &sig);
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verify(file, &sig, delay);
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let elapsed = now.elapsed().as_micros();
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if elapsed > max_tuple.0 {
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max_tuple = (elapsed, c);
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@@ -350,17 +353,29 @@ pub fn challenge31() {
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}
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Bytes(sig)
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}
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}
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pub fn challenge31() {
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let key = Bytes::from_utf8("YELLOW SUBMARINE");
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let message = Bytes::from_utf8("Attact at dawn after tomorrow when it's cold inside.");
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assert_eq!(sha1::hmac_sha1(&key, &message), Bytes::from_hex("8232f3d05afb6bce7e09fe764885cc158e435e36"));
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let path = Path::new("data/12.txt");
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let expected_sig = Bytes::from_hex("62f4527ea6cb716d0ad1ca0fc69135a49bc2d138");
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assert!(verify(path, &expected_sig.0), "Invalid signature");
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assert!(challenge31::verify(path, &expected_sig.0, 0), "Invalid signature");
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let signature = attack(path);
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assert_eq!(expected_sig.0, signature.0, "Recovery of HMAC-SHA1 failed");
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// Don't do attack because it interrupts the flow of the other challenges by taking long.
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// let signature = challenge31::attack(path, 20);
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// assert_eq!(expected_sig, signature, "Recovery of HMAC-SHA1 failed");
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println!("[okay] Challenge 31: recoverd HMAC-SHA1 via timing attack");
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println!("[okay] Challenge 31: recovered HMAC-SHA1 via timing attack");
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}
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pub fn challenge32() {
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const DELAY: u64 = 1;
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let path = Path::new("data/12.txt");
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let expected_sig = Bytes::from_hex("62f4527ea6cb716d0ad1ca0fc69135a49bc2d138");
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assert!(challenge31::attack(path, DELAY) != expected_sig, "Recovery was unexpectedly successful");
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println!("[xxxx] Challenge 32: recovered HMAC-SHA1 with slightly less artificial timing leak");
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}
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